CD: Roa v. Heirs of Santiago Ebora

ROA v. HEIRS OF SANTIAGO EBORA
G.R. No. 161137 March 15, 2010
Corona, J.

Doctrine:
Any right acquired by one buyer over a disputed property cannot prevail over, but must yield to, any superior right possessed by another buyer. The spring cannot rise higher than its source.


Facts:
A parcel of land, which was continuously, openly and adversely possessed by Santiago Ebora, was mistakenly included by Chacon Enterprises in its application for original registration. As a result, litigation arose between the heirs of Ebora and Chacon Enterprises.

During the case’s pendency, the heirs of Ebora sold the land to their co-heir Josefa Ebora Pacardo (Josefa) and her husband Rosalio Pacardo. On the same day, the spouses Pacardo assigned the property to Digno Roa, married to petitioner Lydia Roa. The corresponding deeds of absolute sale and assignment were inscribed on original certificate of title (OCT) and a transfer certificate of title was issued in the name of Digno Roa.

The case was resolved against Chacon Enterprises and in favor of the heirs of Ebora.

Thereafter the heirs of Ebora again adjudicated the land among themselves, pro indiviso. That same day, a deed of confirmation of a prior conveyance by Josefa to respondent Samuel Sonnie Lim of a portion was likewise inscribed on TCT No. T-48097. The issuance of new TCTs in the name of Alejandro Ebora was likewise inscribed in the same. The lots were thereafter sold to various respondents which resulted in the issuance of new TCTs in the names of the respective vendees.

All these transactions occurred without petitioner’s knowledge and consent.

In view of the death of her husband, petitioner filed a petition for annulment and cancellation of TCT No. 48097 and its derivative titles. The RTC ruled against the petitioner. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.


Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a superior right over the land as against the respondents


Held:
Yes. From the moment the disputed land was sold to the spouses Pacardo, the heirs of Ebora lost all their rights and interest over the property.

Thus, the heirs of Ebora had nothing to adjudicate among themselves. Neither did they have anything to transfer to the vendees or successors-in-interest. As such, the transferees of the heirs of Ebora acquired no better right than that of the transferors. The spring cannot rise higher than its source.

Whatever right a buyer, notwithstanding the fact that he is an innocent purchaser for value, may have acquired over the disputed property cannot prevail over, but must yield to, the superior right possessed by another buyer.

Doctrine of Innocent Purchaser

Today, the Supreme Court is set to hear the oral arguments of the petition involving the Hacienda Luisita dispute. Petitioners, who are also President Benigno Aquino III’s cousins, are seeking to overturn a 2005 decision by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) scratching the stock distribution option (SDO) under CARP reached in 1989.

One of the issues to be discussed is whether the Luisita Industrial Park Corp. and Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., as transferees of a portion of the 6,500-hectare estate, may invoke the “doctrine of innocent purchaser.”

Now, what is exactly the doctrine of innocent purchaser?

The subject is summarily discussed in the case of Tan v. Dela Vega, G.R. No. 168809, 10 July 2006.

Accordingly, the doctrine of innocent purchaser rules that a void title may be the source of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.

CD: Continental Steel v. Montaño

Continental Steel v. Montaño
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.

Doctrines:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.

In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.


Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.

It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.

Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence this petition.


Issues:
1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent
3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the employee


Held:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case.

The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy. (Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)])

Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

CD: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines
G.R. No. 163835 July 7, 2010
Brion, J.

Doctrine:
Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and especially when they are more consistent with upholding settled principles in taxation.

The burden of strict compliance with statutory and administrative requirements by the person claiming for a tax refund cannot be offset by the non-observance of procedural technicalities by the government’s tax agents when the non-observance of the remedial measure addressing it does not in any manner prejudice the taxpayer’s due process rights.


Facts:
Eastern filed with the CIR a written application for refund or credit of unapplied input taxes it paid on the imported equipment purchased during 1995 and 1996 amounting to P22,013,134.00. To toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period under the same provision, Eastern filed an appeal with the CTA. The CTA found that Eastern has a valid claim for the refund/credit of the unapplied input taxes, declaring it entitled to a tax refund of P16,229,100.00.

The CIR filed a motion for reconsideration of the CTA’s decision. Subsequently, it filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. The CTA denied the CIR’s motion for reconsideration. The CIR then elevated the case to the CA, who affirmed the CTA ruling and likewise denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.

The CIR posits that, applying Section 104(A) of the Tax Code on apportionment of tax credits, Eastern is entitled to a tax refund of only a portion of the amount claimed. Since the VAT returns clearly reflected income from exempt sales, the CIR asserts that this constitutes as an admission on Eastern’s part that it engaged in transactions not subject to VAT. Hence, the proportionate allocation of the tax credit to VAT and non-VAT transactions provided in Section 104(A) of the Tax Code should apply.

Eastern objects to the arguments raised in the petition, alleging that these have not been raised in the Answer filed by the CIR before the CTA and was only raised. In fact, the CIR only raised the applicability of Section 104(A) of the Tax Code in his supplemental motion for reconsideration of the CTA’s ruling. Eastern claims that for the CIR to raise such an issue now would constitute a violation of its right to due process; following settled rules of procedure and fair play, the CIR should not be allowed at the appeal level to change his theory of the case.

Eastern further argues that there is no evidence on record that would evidently show that respondent is also engaged in other transactions that are not subject to VAT.


Issue:
Whether or not the rule in Section 104(A) of the Tax Code on the apportionment of tax credits can be applied in appreciating Eastern’s claim for tax refund, considering that the matter was raised by the CIR only when he sought reconsideration of the CTA ruling


Held:
Yes. The question of the applicability of Section 104(A) of the Tax Code was already raised but the tax court did not rule on it. This failure should not be taken against the CIR. The mere declaration of exempt sales in the VAT returns, whether based on Section 103 of the Tax Code or some other special law, should have prompted for the application of Section 104 (A) of the Tax Code to Eastern’s claim.

The general rule is that appeals can only raise questions of law or fact that (a) were raised in the court below, and (b) are within the issues framed by the parties therein (People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472). An issue which was neither averred in the pleadings nor raised during trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

The rule against raising new issues on appeal is not without exceptions; it is a procedural rule that the Court may relax when compelling reasons so warrant or when justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the courts (CIR v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, G.R. No. 159593). Another exception is when the question involves matters of public importance.

“Taxes are the lifeblood of the government.” For this reason, the right of taxation cannot easily be surrendered; statutes granting tax exemptions are considered as a derogation of the sovereign authority and are strictly construed against the person or entity claiming the exemption. Claims for tax refunds, when based on statutes granting tax exemption or tax refund, partake of the nature of an exemption; thus, the rule of strict interpretation against the taxpayer-claimant similarly applies (CIR v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. Nos. 167274-75).

The taxpayer is charged with the heavy burden of proving that he has complied with and satisfied all the statutory and administrative requirements to be entitled to the tax refund. This burden cannot be offset by the non-observance of procedural technicalities by the government’s tax agents when the non-observance of the remedial measure addressing it does not in any manner prejudice the taxpayer’s due process rights.

Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and especially when they are more consistent with upholding settled principles in taxation.

Supreme Plagiarism

The Supreme Court is threading a lot of negative criticisms nowadays. This article of Former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban sheds light on the issue of plagiarism facing the High Court.

With Due Respect : Plagiarism in the Supreme Court?
By Artemio V. Panganiban
Columnist
Philippine Daily Inquirer
Posted date: August 07, 2010


THE SUPREME Court is once more embattled. This time, the battle relates not just to the wisdom of its decision. This time, it seeps to the very ability and integrity of the Court to write its judgments. A group of litigants is accusing it of plagiarism and of misusing the allegedly plagiarized materials to support the opposite of what the plagiarized items were intended to uphold.Short backgrounder. On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court en banc, in “Vinuya vs Romulo,” dismissed the petition of more than 70 comfort women belonging to the “Malaya Lolas Organization.” It refused to compel the respondent government officials to secure from Japan an “apology and other forms of reparations” for the rape and other abuses committed by Japanese soldiers against them during World War II.Essentially, the Court ruled that the power to conduct foreign relations is an executive prerogative that the Court could not interfere with. Since the Treaty of Peace with Japan already settled all war claims of the Philippines, the Court said it could not attribute grave abuse to the respondent officials for refusing to take up the cudgels for the comfort women at this late stage.Instead of just challenging the merits of the decision in their motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration, the comfort women’s lawyers—Harry Roque and Romel Bagares—also accused the Court of “wholly lift(ing), without proper attribution, from at least three sources.”They identified the writers and the plagiarized articles as: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent from their article, “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens” published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book, “Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law” published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and (3) Mark Ellis from his article, “Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime” published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006.

International dimension. Before the Court could rule on these motions, Dr. Mark Ellis—one of the three authors—sent an e-mail to the justices, dated July 23, saying: “In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28 of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross-purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.” In a blog in Opinio Juris, Criddle found the alleged plagiarism and contrary conclusion “most troubling.”

To stress the international dimension of his intervention, Ellis signed his letter in his capacity as “executive director” of the International Bar Association based in London. IBA is the largest lawyers’ organization in the world.

Soon enough, calls for discipline against the decision writer and the nine justices who concurred in full with the decision (the rest concurred only in part, or only “in the result”) erupted. The Court referred the complaint for investigation and recommendation to the newly created Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, composed of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, chairman; Justice Teresita J. Leonardo de Castro, working vice chair, Justices Roberto A. Abad, Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Mendoza, members. Retired Justice Jose C. Vitug was named a non-voting observer-consultant.

Delicate questions. While the Court acted on the complaint with commendable speed, it still faces major dilemmas because all the Ethics Committee members concurred unqualifiedly in the decision penned by Justice Mariano C. del Castillo. Pages 33 and 34 of the decision show that nine magistrates concurred fully with the ponente; namely, all the five members of the Ethics Committee, plus Justices Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Arturo D. Brion, Lucas P. Bersamin and Martin S. Villarama Jr.

Five other magistrates scribbled their votes on the signature pages of the decision, as follows: then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, “In the result”; Justice Antonio T. Carpio, “I concur on the ground that petitioners’ claims are barred by the Peace Treaty between RP and Japan”; while Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura filed a short separate opinion concurring “in the result on strictly procedural grounds,” to which Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Diosdado M. Peralta “joined.”

On July 22, Justice Del Castillo wrote his colleagues, saying “(t)here was every intention to attribute all sources whenever due. At no point was there ever any malicious intent to appropriate another’s work as our own… This case has not attained finality; in fact, it is pending resolution of the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. As such it is still within the power of the Court to reverse or amend its decision…” Last Tuesday, Roque and Bagares were asked to comment on this letter.

The case raises novel questions, like: As it applies to judicial decisions, what constitutes plagiarism? What is the penalty for its commission? Who, if any, should be held responsible? May those who fully concurred with the decision investigate the matter as members of the Ethics Committee?

Having caught national and international attention, the delicate issue of plagiarism as it relates to decision-making deserves prudent, fair and speedy resolution.

* * *

CD: Republic v. Philippine Resources Development Corporation

REPUBLIC v. PHILIPPINE RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-10141 January 31, 1958
Padilla, J.

Doctrine:
Article 1458 provides that the purchaser may pay “a price certain in money or its equivalent,” which means that the price need not be in money.


Facts:
The Bureau of Prisons instituted a complaint against Macario Apostol for the latter’s failure to pay the unpaid balance for logs purchased. Apostol, who was then the president of the respondent corporation, delivered goods belonging to the corporation and without the knowledge or consent of the stockholders thereof, to the Bureau of Prisons in an attempt to settle his personal debts with the latter entity. The corporation demanded the Bureau of Prisons for the return of the goods. Upon the refusal of the Bureau, the corporation filed a motion to intervene.


Issue:
Whether or not “price” is limited only to be paid in money


Held:
No. Article 1458 provides that the purchaser may pay “a price certain in money or its equivalent,” which means that they meant of the price need not be in money. In this case, the materials have been assessed and evaluated and their price equivalent in terms of money have been determined and that said materials for whatever price they have been assigned were considered as tokens of payment.

CD: Leabres v. CA

LEABRES v. CA
G.R. No. L-41847 December 12, 1986
Paras, J.

Doctrine:
A receipt can neither be regarded as a contract of sale nor a promise to sell. In here, there is an absence of the essential requisites of a contract of sale.


Facts:
Plaintiff purchased a portion of a subdivision from the surviving husband of the deceased owner, evidenced by a receipt. The Philippine Trust Co relieved the surviving husband as administrator and advertised the sale of the subdivision. Since no adverse claim or interest over the subdivision or any portion thereof was ever presented by any person, the Philippine Trust Co. executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subdivision in favor of the Manotok Realty, Inc.. The deed was judicially approved and recorded immediately in the Register of Deeds which issued the corresponding Certificates of Title.


Issue:
Whether or not a receipt is a valid basis of a contract of sale


Held:
No. An examination of the receipt reveals that the same can neither be regarded as a contract of sale or a promise to sell. There was merely an acknowledgment of the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). The requisites of a valid Contract of Sale, namely 1) consent or meeting of the minds of the parties; 2) determinate subject matter; 3) price certain in money or its equivalent, are lacking in the said receipt.

A Little Breather

The recent national elections caught the people by surprise in the manner it blew by with the tallying of the votes. Most would agree that somehow there was an improvement, particularly with the efficiency factor. One would not dwell on how praise-worthy this consequential betterment is because of everybody’s knowledge that efficiency deserves a shiny medal only if the corresponding results possess the targeted quality. It would be worth pointing out that early critics of this year’s automated elections were proven wrong, with some actually happy and thankful for being wrong. This election’s process as a whole may not be considered outstanding, but it can be very well said that it has been satisfactory so far.

Unfortunately for most (indeed!) hardworking people of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), issues never cease. During the occasion, the Commission’s responsibility usually offers a no breather. From a talking koala bear to losing presidential candidates teaming up to form their local version of The Avengers, the circus show of an election that we already have has just added a whole new roster of freaks.

Every patriot has the duty to report any irregularities. The public has the right to know. However, the complainant’s motive must also be equally weighed, especially if the issues being raised are not material enough to change the outcome of the elections. This notwithstanding the lack of veracity and credibility of the witness, herein referred to as the koala.

This is like after sex wherein the female would beg for cuddling or sweet talk from the male before dozing off. Can’t just the public be thankful for enjoying the ride and reward the exhausted people of COMELEC a well deserved rest?

One has to admire COMELEC’s creativity to address these issues. Take Mr. Jimenez and Commissioner Larrazabal as examples. They even created their own twitter accounts to stretch their reach to the public (for the record, @jabjimenez’ tweets are wackier than @comm_larrazabal’s). With this, the next appointing authority should be open to manning up the COMELEC with young people possessing the zeal required by the job (Update: He didn't.). Senior members of the Commission, particularly Commissioners Melo and Sarmiento, deserve all the respect and felicitations but this is one change worth pursuing.

Commissioner Sarmiento once mentioned in his philosophy class that the right of suffrage must be exercised for it begets the people’s liberty and freedom. Although the right of suffrage indirectly includes the right to question the results, the people must keep in mind that the lawmakers drafted this country’s electoral laws with the intention of promoting honest and free elections as a constitutional prerogative and not as a waveboard for bad hats to ride along in twisting the people’s choice.

Blogger’s Resume

WILLIAM BARTOLOME MANUEL is a certified public accountant. He is also a part-time tax and accounting professor. As a working student, he is presently pursuing his law degree.

William has extensive experience in taxation having specialized in this field since joining an established accounting firm in the Philippines. His career includes stints as Tax Officer in the Oil, Advertising, and Insurance Industries, all with established industry leaders.

On some occasions, he conducts special tax review classes to CPA aspirants.

You can e-mail the author at wrmanuel@gmail.com.

The Dark Lion Now Roams

Dark Lion’s Compendium

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William Ray Manuel